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Preface
The ubiquitous presence of computer simulations in all kinds of research areas evi-
dence their role as the new driving force for the advancement of science and engineer-
ing research. Nothing seems to escape the image of success that computer simulations
project onto the research community and the general public. One simple way to illus-
trate this consists in asking ourselves how would contemporary science and engineering
look like without the use of computer simulations. The answer would certainly diverge
from the current image we have of scientific and engineering research.
As much as computer simulations are successful, they are also methods that fail
in their purpose of inquiring about the world; and as much as researchers make use of
them, computer simulations raise important questions that are at the heart of contem-
porary science and engineering practice. In this respect, computer simulations make a
fantastic subject of research for the natural sciences, the social sciences, engineering
and, as in our case, also for philosophy. Studies on computer simulations touch upon
many different facets of scientific and engineering research, and evoke philosophically
inclined questions of interpretation with close ties to problems in experimental settings
and engineering applications.
This book will introduce the reader, in an accessible and self-contained manner, to
these various fascinating aspects of computer simulations. An historical study on the
conceptualization of computer simulations throughout the past sixty years opens up the
vast world of computer simulations and their implications. The focus then is shifted
to the discussion on their methodology, their epistemology, and the possibilities of an
ethical framework, among other issues.
The scope of this book is relatively broad in order to familiarize the reader with
the many facets of computer simulations. Throughout the book, I have sought to main-
tain a healthy balance between the conceptual ideas associated with the philosophy of
computer simulations on the one hand, and their practice in science and engineering
on the other hand. To this end, the book has been conceived for a broad audience,
from scientists and engineers, policy makers and academics, to the general public. It
welcomes anyone interested in philosophical questions – and conceivable answers – to
issues raised by the theory and practice of computer simulations. It must be mentioned
that, although the book is written in a philosophical tone, it does not engage in deep
philosophical discussions. Rather, it seeks to explore the synergy between technical
aspects of computer simulations and the philosophical value there emerging. In this
respect, the ideal readers of this book are researchers across disciplines working on
computer simulations but holding philosophical inclinations. This is, of course, not to
say that professional philosophers would not find in its pages problems and questions
for their own research.
One beautiful thing about computer simulations is that they offer a fertile field of
research, both for researchers using the simulations as well as those reflecting upon
them. In this respect, although the book might have some merits, it also falls short in
many respects. For instance, it does not address the work of computer simulations in
the social sciences, a very fruitful area of research. It also does not discuss the use of
computer simulations in and for policy making, their uses for reporting to the general
public, nor their role in a democratic society where science and engineering practice
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is a common good. This is certainly unfortunate. But there are two reasons that, I
hope, excuse the book from these shortcomings. One is that I am not a specialist in
any of these fields of research, therefore my contribution would have been of little
interest. Each of the fields mentioned brings about specific issues in their own right
that those involved in their study know best. The second reason stems from the fact
that, as all researchers know, time – and also in this case, space – are tyrant. It would
be an impossible task to even scratch the surface of the many areas where computer
simulations are active and thriving.
As a general rule for the book, I present a given topic and discuss problems and
potential solutions to it. No topic should be addressed as unrelated to any other topic in
the book, nor should a proposed answers be taken as final. In this sense, the book aims
at motivating further discussions, rather than providing a closed set of topics and the
answers to their core issues. Each chapter should nevertheless present a self-contained
discussion of a general theme of computer simulations. I must also mention that each
chapter contains profuse references to the specialized literature, giving the reader the
opportunity to pursue further his or her own interests on a given subject.
The book is organized as follows. In chapter 1, I address the question ‘what are
computer simulations?’ by giving an historical overview of the concept. Tracking back
the concept of computer simulation to the early 1960s, we will soon realize that many
contemporary definitions owe much to these early attempts. A proper grasp of the
history of the concept will turn out to be very important for the development of a solid
understanding of computer simulations. In particular, I identify two traditions, one that
puts the emphasis on implementing mathematical models on the computer, and another
for which the yellow prominent feature is the representational capacity of the computer
simulation. Depending on which tradition researchers chose to follow, the assumptions
and implications to be drawn from computer simulations will differ. The chapter ends
with a discussion on the now standard classification of computer simulations.
The core of chapter 2 is to introduce and discuss in detail the constituents of simu-
lation models – that is, the models at the basis of computer simulations. To this end, I
discuss diverse approaches to scientific and engineering models with the purpose of en-
trenching simulation models as a rather different kind. Once this is accomplished, the
chapter goes on presenting and discussing three units of analysis constitutive of com-
puter simulations, namely, the specification, the algorithm, and the computer process.
This chapter is the most technical of the book, as it draws extensively from studies
on software engineering and computer science. In order to balance this with some
philosophy, it also presents several problems related to these units of analysis – both
individually and in relation to each other.
The sole purpose of chapter 3 is to present the discussion on whether computer
simulations are epistemologically equivalent to laboratory experimentation. The im-
portance of establishing such equivalence has its roots in a tradition that takes exper-
imentation as the solid foundation for our insight into the world. Since much of the
work demanded from computer simulations is to provide knowledge and understand-
ing of real-world phenomena that would otherwise not be possible, then the question of
their epistemological power in comparison with laboratory experimentation naturally
occurs. Following the philosophical tradition of discussing these issues, I focus on the
now time-honored problem of the ‘materiality’ of computer simulations.
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Although chapters 4 and 5 are independent of each other, they do share the inter-
est in establishing the epistemological power of computer simulations. While chapter
4 does so by discussing the many ways in which computer simulations are reliable,
chapter 5 does it by showing the many epistemic functions attached to computer sim-
ulations. These two chapters, then, represent my contribution to the many attempts to
ground the epistemic power of computer simulations. Let us note that these chapters
are, at their basis, an answer to chapter 2, which discusses computer simulations vis a`
vis laboratory experimentation.
Next, chapter 6 addresses issues that are arguably less visible in the literature on
computer simulations. The core question here is whether computer simulations should
be understood as a third paradigm of scientific and engineering research – theory, ex-
perimentation, and Big Data being the first, second, and fourth paradigm respectively.
To this end, I first discuss the use of Big Data in scientific and engineering practice,
and what it means to be a paradigm. With these elements in mind, I begin a discussion
on the possibilities of holding causal relations in Big Data science as well as com-
puter simulations, and what this means for the establishment of these methodologies
as paradigms of research. I finish the chapter with a comparison between computer
simulations and Big Data with a special emphasis on what sets them apart.
The last chapter of the book, chapter 7, addresses an issue that has been virtually
unexplored in the literature on ethics of technology, that is, the prospect of an ethics
of computer simulations. Admittedly, the literature on computer simulations is more
interested in their methodology and epistemology, and much less on the ethical impli-
cations that comes with designing, implementing, and using computer simulations. In
response to this lack of attention, I approach this chapter as an overview to the ethical
problems addressed in the specialized literature.
Stuttgart, Germany, Juan M. Dura´n
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Introduction
In 2009, a debate erupted around the question of whether computer simulations intro-
duce novel philosophical problems or if they are merely a scientific novelty. Roman
Frigg and Julian Reiss, two prominent philosophers that ignited the debate, noted that
philosophers have largely assumed some form of philosophical novelty of computer
simulations without actually engaging the question of its possibility. Such an assump-
tion rested on one simple confusion: philosophers were thinking that scientific novelty
licenses philosophical novelty. This gave course to issuing a warning over the growth
of overemphasized and generally unwarranted claims about the philosophical impor-
tance of computer simulations. This growth, according to the authors, was reflected
in the increasing number of philosophers convinced that the philosophy of science,
nourished by computer simulations, required an entirely new epistemology, a revised
ontology, and novel semantics.
It is important to point out that Frigg and Reiss are not objecting to the novelty of
computer simulations in scientific and engineering practice, nor their importance in the
advancement of science, but rather that simulations raise few, if any, new philosophical
question. In their own words, “[t]he philosophical problems that do come up in connec-
tion with simulations are not specific to simulations and most of them are variants of
problems that have been discussed in other contexts before. This is not to say that sim-
ulations do not raise new problems of their own. These specific problems are, however,
mostly of a mathematical or psychological, not philosophical nature” [16, 595].
I share Frigg and Reiss’ puzzlement on this issue. It is hard to believe that a new
scientific method – instrument, mechanism, etc. – however powerful as it might be,
could all by itself imperil current philosophy of science and technology to the point
that they need to be rewritten. But this is only true if we accept the claim that computer
simulations come to rewrite long-standing disciplines, which I do not think it is the
case. To me, if we are able to reconstruct and give new meaning to old philosophical
problems in light of computer simulations, then we are basically establishing their
philosophical novelty.
Let us now ask the question in what sense are computer simulations a philosophical
novelty? There are two ways to unpack the problem. Either computer simulations pose
a series of philosophical questions that escape standard philosophical treatment, in
which case they can be added to our philosophical corpus; or they challenge established
philosophical ideas, in which case the current corpus expands standard debates into
new domains. The first case has been proposed by [26], whereas the second case has
been argued by myself [13]. Let me now briefly discuss why computer simulations
represent, in many respects, a scientific and philosophical novelty.
The core of Humphreys’ argument is to recognize that we could either understand
computer simulations by focusing on how traditional philosophy illuminates their study
(e.g., through a philosophy of models, or a philosophy of experiment), or by focusing
exclusively on aspects about computer simulations that constitute, in and by them-
selves, genuine philosophical challenges. It is this second way of looking at the ques-
tions about their novelty that grants philosophical importance to computer simulations.
The chief claim here is that computer simulations can solve otherwise intractable
models and thus amplify our cognitive abilities. But such amplification comes with
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a price “for an increasing number of fields in science, an exclusively anthropocentric
epistemology is no longer appropriate because there now exist superior, non-human,
epistemic authorities” [26, 617]. Humphreys calls this the anthropocentric predica-
ment as a way to illustrate current trends in science and engineering where computer
simulations are moving humans away from the center of production of knowledge.
According to him, a brief overview on the history of philosophy of science shows that
humans have always been at the center of production of knowledge. This conclusion
includes the period of the logical and empirical positivism, where the human senses
were the ultimate authority [26, 616]. A similar conclusion follows from the analysis
of alternatives to the empiricist, such as Quine’s and Kuhn’s epistemologies.
When confronted with claims about the philosophical novelty of computer simu-
lations, Humphreys points out that the standard empiricist viewpoint has prevented a
complete separation between humans and their capacity to evaluate and produce scien-
tific knowledge. The anthropocentric predicament, then, comes to highlight precisely
this separation: it is the claim that humans have lost their privileged position as the
ultimate epistemic authority.1 The claim finally gets its support from the view that sci-
entific practice only progresses because new methods are available for handling large
amounts of information. Handling information, according to Humphreys, is the key
for the progress of science today, which can only be attainable if humans are removed
from the center of the epistemic activity [25, 8].
The anthropocentric predicament, as philosophically relevant as it is in itself, also
brings about four extra novelties unanalyzed by the traditional philosophy of science.
Those are epistemic opacity, the temporal dynamics of simulations, semantics, and the
in practice/in principle distinction. All four are novel philosophical issues brought up
by computer simulations; all four have no answer in traditional philosophical accounts
of models and experimentation; and all four represent a challenge for the philosophy
of science.
The first novelty is epistemic opacity, a topic that is currently attracting much at-
tention from philosophers. Although I discuss this issue in some detail in section ??,
briefly mentioning the basic assumptions behind epistemic opacity will shed some light
on the novelty of computer simulations. Epistemic opacity, then, is the philosophical
position that takes that it is impossible for any human to know all the epistemically
relevant elements of a computer simulation. Humphreys presents this point in the fol-
lowing way: “A process is essentially epistemically opaque to [a cognitive agent] X if
and only if it is impossible, given the nature of X, for X to know all of the epistemically
relevant elements of the process” [26, 618]. To put the same idea in a different form, if
a cognitive agent could stop the computer simulation and take a look inside, she would
not be able to know the previous states of the process, reconstruct the simulation up
to the point of stop, or predict future states given previous states. Being epistemically
opaque means that, due to the complexity and speed of the computational process, no
cognitive agent could know what makes a simulation an epistemically relevant process.
A second novelty that is related to epistemic opacity is the temporal dynamics of
1Humphreys makes a further distinction between scientific practice completely carried out by computers
– one that he calls the automated scenario – and one in which computers only partially fulfill scientific
activity – that is, the hybrid scenario. He restricts his analysis, however, to the hybrid scenario [26, 616-
617].
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computer simulations. This concept has two possible interpretations. Either it refers to
the necessary computer-time to solve the simulation model, or it stands for the temporal
development of the target system as represented in the simulation model. A good
example that merges these two ideas is a simulation of the atmosphere: the simulation
model represents the dynamics of the atmosphere for a year and it takes, say, ten days
to compute.
These two novelties nicely illustrate what is typical of computer simulations, namely,
the inherent complexity of simulations in themselves, as is the case of epistemic opac-
ity and the first interpretation of temporal dynamics; and the inherent complexity of
the target systems that computer simulations usually represent, as it is the case of the
second interpretation of temporal dynamics. What is common between these two nov-
elties is that they both entrench computers as the epistemic authority since they are able
to produce reliable results that no human or group of human could produce by them-
selves. Either because the process of computing is too complex to follow or because the
target system is too complex to comprehend, computers become the exclusive source
for obtaining information about the world.
The second interpretation of temporal dynamics is tailored to the novelty of the
semantics, which asks the question of how theories and models represent the world,
now adjusting the picture to fit a computer algorithm. Thus, the chief issue here is how
the syntax of a computer algorithm maps onto the world, and how a given theory is
actually brought into contact with data.
Finally, the distinction in principle/in practice is intended to sort out what is ap-
plicable in practice and what is applicable only in principle. To Humphreys, it is a
philosophical fantasy to say that, in principle, all mathematical models find a solu-
tion within computer simulations [26, 623]. It is a fantasy because it is clearly false,
although philosophers have claimed its possibility – hence, in principle. Humphreys
suggests, instead, that in approaching computers, philosophers must keep a more down-
to-earth attitude, limited to the technical and empirical constraints that simulations can
offer.
My position is complementary to Humphreys’ in the sense that it shows how com-
puter simulations challenge established ideas in the philosophy of science. To this end,
I begin by arguing for a specific way of understanding simulation models, the kind
of model at the basis of computer simulations. To me, a simulation model recasts a
multiplicity of models into one ‘super-model’. That is to say, simulation models are
an amalgam of different sorts of computer models, all having their own scales, input
parameters, and protocols. In this context, I claim for three novelties in philosophy,
namely, representation, abstraction, and explanation.
About the first novelty, I claim that the multiplicity of models implies that rep-
resentation of a target system is more holistic in the sense that it encompasses all and
every model implemented in the simulation model. To put the same idea in a rather dif-
ferent form, the representation of the simulation model is not given by any individual
implemented model but rather by the combination of all of them.
The challenge that computer simulations bring to the notion of abstraction and
idealization is that, typically, the latter presupposes some form of neglecting stance.
Thus, abstraction aims at ignoring concrete features that the target system possesses
in order to focus on their formal set-up; idealizations, on the other hand, come in two
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flavors: while Aristotelian idealizations consist in ‘stripping away’ properties that we
believe not to be relevant for our purposes, Galilean idealizations involve deliberate
distortions. Now, in order to implement the required variety of models into a single
simulation model, it is important to count on techniques by which information is hidden
from the users, but not neglected from the models [9]. This is to say that the properties,
structures, operations, relations and the like present in each mathematical model can be
effectively implemented into the simulation model without stating explicitly how such
implementation is carried out.
Finally, scientific explanation is a time-honored philosophical topic where much
has been said. When it comes to explanation in computer simulations, however, I
propose a rather different look at the issue than the standard treatment offers. One
interesting point here is that, in the classic idea that explanation is of a real-world phe-
nomenon I oppose the claim that explanation is, first and foremost, of the results of
computer simulations. In this context, many new questions emerge seeking for an an-
swer. I discuss scientific explanation in more detail in section ??.
As I have mentioned before, I do believe that computer simulations raise novel
questions for the philosophy of science. This book is living proof of that belief. But
even if we do not believe in their philosophical novelty, we still need to understand
computer simulations as scientific novelties with a critical and philosophical eye. To
these ends, this book presents and discusses several theoretical and philosophical issues
at the heart of computer simulations. Having said all of this, we may now submerge
ourselves into their pages.
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Chapter 1
The universe of computer
simulations
The universe of computer simulations is vast, flourishing in almost every scientific
discipline, and still resisting a general conceptualization. From the early computations
of the Moon’s orbit carried out by punched card machines, to the most recent attempts
to simulate quantum states, computer simulations have a uniquely short but very rich
history.
We can situate the first use of a machine for scientific purposes in England at the
end of the 1920s. More precisely, it was in 1928 when the young astronomer and pio-
neer in the use of machines Leslie J. Comrie predicted the motion of the Moon for the
years 1935 to 2000. During that year, Comrie made intensive use of a Herman Hollerith
punched card machine to compute the summation of harmonic terms in predicting the
Moon’s orbit. Such groundbreaking work would not stay in the shadows, and by the
mid 1930s it had cross the ocean to Columbia University in New York City. It was
there that Wallace Eckert founded a laboratory that made use of punched card tabu-
lating machines – now built by IBM – to perform calculations related to astronomical
research, including of course an extensive study of the motion of the Moon.
Both Comrie’s and Eckert’s uses of punched card machines share a few common-
alities with today’s use of simulations. Most prominently, both implement a special
kind of model that describes the behavior of a target system, and which can be inter-
preted and computed by a machine. While Comrie’s computing rendered data about
the motions of the Moon, Eckert’s simulation described planetary movement.
These methods certainly pioneered and revolutionized their respective fields, as
well as many other branches of the natural and social sciences. However, Comrie’s
and Eckert’s simulations significantly differ from today’s computer simulations. Upon
closer inspection, differences can be found everywhere. The introduction of silicon
based circuits, as well as the subsequent standardization of the circuit board, made
a significant contribution to the growth of computational power. The increase in the
speed of calculation, size of memory, and expressive power of programming language
forcefully challenged the established ideas on the nature of computation and of its do-
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main of application. Punched card machines rapidly became obsolete as they are slow
in speed, unreliable in their results, limited in their programming, and based on stiff
technology (e.g., there were very few exchangeable modules). In fact, a major disad-
vantage of the punched card over modern computers is that they are error-prone and
time-consuming machines, and therefore the reliability of their results as well as their
representational accuracy is difficult to ground. However, perhaps the most radical
difference between Comrie’s and Eckert’s simulations, on the one hand, and modern
computer simulations on the other, is the automation process that characterizes the lat-
ter. In today computer simulations, researchers are losing grounds on their influence
and power to interfere in the process of computing, and this will become more promi-
nent as complexity and computational power increases.
Modern computers come to amend many aspect of scientific and engineering prac-
tice with more precise computations, and more accurate representations. Accuracy,
computational power, and reduction of errors are, as we will see, the main keys of
computer simulations that unlock the world.
In light of contemporary computers, then, it is not correct to maintain that Comrie’s
prediction of the motion of the Moon and Eckert’s solution of planetary equations are
computer simulations. This is, of course, not to say that they are not simulations at all.
But in order to accommodate to the way scientists and engineers use the term today, it
is not sufficient to be able to compute a special model or to produce certain kinds of
results about a target system. Speed, storage, language expressiveness, and the capacity
to be (re)programmed are chief concepts for the modern notion of computer simulation.
What are computer simulations then? This is a philosophically motivated question
that has found different answers from scientists, engineers, and philosophers. The
heterogeneity of their answers makes explicit how differently each researcher conceives
computer simulations, how their definitions vary from one generation to the next, and
how difficult it is to come up with a unified notion. It is important, however, to have a
good sense of their nature. Let us discuss this in more extent.
1.1 What are computer simulations?
Recent philosophical literature takes computer simulations as aids for overcoming im-
perfections and limitations of human cognition. Such imperfections and limitations
are tailored to the natural human constrains of computing, processing and classifying
large amounts of data. Paul Humphreys, one of the first contemporary philosophers to
address computer simulations from a purely philosophical viewpoint, takes then as an
‘amplification instrument,’ that is, one that speeds up what the unaided human could
not do by herself [25, 110]. In a similar sense, Margaret Morrison, yet another central
figure in philosophical studies on computer simulations, considers that although they
are another form of modeling, “given the various functions of simulation [...] one could
certainly characterize it as a type of ‘enhanced’ modelling” [31, 47].
Both claims are fundamentally correct. Computer simulations compute, analyze,
render, and visualize data in many ways that are unattainable for any group of humans.
Contrast, for instance, the time required for a human to identify potential antibiotics
for infections diseases such as anthrax, with a simulation of the ribosome in motion
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at atomic detail [28]. Or, if preferred, compare any set of human computational ca-
pabilities with the supercomputers used at the High Performance Computing Center
Stuttgart, home of the Cray XC40 Hazel Hen with a peak performance of 7.42 Petaflops
and a memory capacity of 128 GB per node.1
As pointed out by Humphreys and Morrison, there are different senses in which
computer simulations enhance our capacities. This could be by amplifying our calcu-
lation skills, as Humphreys suggests, or it could be by enhancing our modeling abilities,
as Morrison suggests.
One would be naturally inclined to think that computer simulations amplify our
computational capability as well as enhance our modeling abilities. However, a quick
look at the history of the concept shows otherwise. To some authors, a proper defi-
nition must highlight the importance of finding solutions to a model. To others, the
right definition centers the attention to describing patterns of behavior of a target sys-
tem. Under the first interpretation, the computational power of the machine allows us
to solve models that, otherwise, would be analytically intractable. In that respect, a
computer simulation ‘amplifies’ or ‘enhances’ our cognitive capacities by providing
computational power to what is beyond our cognitive reach. The notion of computer
simulation is then dependent on the physics of the computer and furnishes the idea that
technological change expands the boundaries of scientific and engineering research.
Such a claim is also historically grounded. From Hollerith’s punched card machines
to the silicon-based computer, the increment of the physical power of computers has
enabled scientists and engineers to find different solutions to a variety of models. Let
me call this first interpretation the problem-solving viewpoint on computer simulations.
Under the second interpretation, the emphasis is on the capacity of the simulation
to describe a target system. For this, we have a powerful language that represents,
to certain acceptable degrees of detail, several levels of description. In that respect,
a computer simulation ‘amplifies’ or ‘enhances’ our modeling abilities by providing
more accurate representation of a target system. Thus understood, the notion of com-
puter simulation is tailored to the way in which they describe a target system, and thus
on the computer language used, modularization methods, software engineering tech-
niques, etc. I call this second interpretation the description of patterns of behavior
viewpoint on computer simulations.
Because both viewpoints emphasize different – although not necessarily incom-
patible – interpretations of computer simulations as enhancers, some distinctions can
be drawn. For starters, under the problem-solving viewpoint, computer simulations
are not experiments in any traditional sense, but rather the manipulation of an abstract
and formal structure (i.e., mathematical models). In fact, to many advocates of this
viewpoint, experimental practice is confined to the traditional laboratory as computer
simulations are more of a crunching numbers practice, closer to mathematics and logic.
The description of patterns of behavior viewpoint, on the other hand, allows us to treat
computer simulations as experiments in a straightforward sense. The underlying in-
1It is worth noting that our neuronal network activity is, in some specific cases, faster than any super-
computer. According to relatively recent publication, Japan’s Fujitsu K computer, consisting of 82,944
processors, takes about 40 minutes to simulate one second of neuronal network activity in real, biological
time. In order to partially simulate the human neural activity, researchers create about 1.73 billion virtual
nerve cells that were connected to 10.4 trillion virtual synapses [22].
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tuition is that by means of describing the behavior of a target system, researchers are
capable of carrying out something very similar to traditional experimental practice,
such as measuring values, observing quantities, and detecting entities.
Understanding things this way has some kinship with the methodology of computer
simulations. As I discuss later, the problem-solving technique viewpoint considers a
simulation to be the direct implementation of a model on a physical computer. That
is to say, mathematical models are implemented on the computer simpliciter. The
description of patterns of behavior viewpoint, instead, holds that computer simulations
have a proper methodology which it is rather different from anything we have seen
in the scientific and engineering arena. These methodological differences between the
two viewpoints turn out to be central for later disputes about the novelty of computer
simulations in scientific and engineering research.
Another difference between these two viewpoints lies in the reasons for using com-
puter simulations. Whereas the problem-solving viewpoint asserts that the use of com-
puter simulations is only pragmatically justified when the model cannot be solved by
more traditional methods, the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint considers
that computer simulations offer valuable insight into the target system despite its ana-
lytical intractability. Let us note that what is also at stake here is the epistemic priority
of one method over another. If the use of computer simulations is only justified when
the model cannot be analytically solved – as many advocates of the problem-solving
viewpoint claim – then analytic methods are epistemically superior to computational.
This configures a specific standpoint regarding the place that computer simulations
have in the scientific and engineering agenda. In particular, it significantly downplays
the reliability of computer simulations for research in uncharted territory. We will have
more to say about this throughout this book.2
Finally, tackling problems in computer simulations can be very different depend-
ing on the viewpoint adopted. For the problem-solving viewpoint, any issues related to
the results of the simulation (e.g., accuracy, computability, representability, etc.) can
be solved on technical grounds (i.e., by increasing speed and memory, changing the
underlying architecture, etc.). Instead, for the advocate of the description of patterns
of behavior, the same issues have an entirely different treatment. Incorrect results, for
instance, are approached by analyzing practical considerations at the design level, such
as new specifications for the target system, alternative assessments of expertise knowl-
edge, new programming languages, etc. In the same vein, incorrect results might be
due to misrepresentation of the target system at the design, specification, and program-
ming stages (see section ??), or misrepresentations at the computational stage (e.g.,
errors during computing time – see section ??). The researcher’s general understand-
ing as well as solution to these issues changes significantly depending on the viewpoint
adopted.
To illustrate some of the points made so far, take a simple equation-based computer
simulation of the dynamics of satellite orbiting around a planet under tidal stress. To
simulate such dynamics, researchers typically begins with a mathematical model of
2Many philosophers have tried to understand the nature of computer simulations. What I have offered
above is just one possible characterization. For more, the reader could refer to the following authors [54, 51,
32, 55, 41].
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the target system. A good model is furnished by classical Newtonian mechanics, as
described by M. M. Woolfson and G. J. Pert in [59].
For a planet of mass M and a satellite of mass m (M), in an orbit of semi-major
axis a and eccentricity e, the total energy is
E =−GMm
2a
(1.1)
and the angular momentum is
H = {GMa(1− e2)}m (1.2)
If E is to decrease, then a must become smaller; but if H is constant, then e must
become smaller – that is to say, that the orbit must round off. The quantity which
remains constant is a(1−e2), the semi-latus rectum as shown in Figure 1.1. The planet
is described by a point mass, P, and the satellite by a distribution of three masses, each
m/3, at positions S1,S2 and S3, forming an equilateral triangle when free of stress. The
masses are connected, as shown, by springs, each of unstressed length l and the same
spring constant, k (figure 1.2). Thus a spring constantly stretched to a length l′ will
exert an inward force equal to
F = k(l′− l) (1.3)
It is also important to introduce a dissipative element into the system by making
the force dependent on the rate of expansion or contraction of the spring, giving the
following force law:
F = k(l′− l)− cdl
′
dt
(1.4)
where the force acts inwards at the two ends. It is the second term in equation 1.4
which gives the simulation of the hysteresis losses in the satellite [59, 18-19].
This is a model for a computer simulation of a satellite in orbit around a planet sub-
ject to tidal stress. The satellite stretches along the radius vector in a periodic fashion,
provided that the orbit is non-circular. Given that the satellite is not perfectly elastic,
there will be hysteresis effects and some of the mechanical energy will be converted
into heat and radiated away. For all purposes, nevertheless, the simulation fully speci-
fies the target system.
Equations 1.1 through 1.4 are a general description of the target system. Since
the intention is to simulate a specific real-world phenomenon with concrete features, it
must be singled out by setting the values for the parameters of the simulation. In the
case of Woolfson and Pert, they use the following set of parameter values [59, 20]:
1. number of bodies = 4
2. mass of the first body (planet) = 2 x 1027 kg
3. mass of satellite = 3 x 1022 kg
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Figure 1.1: The elliptical orbit of a satellite relative to the planet at one focus. Points q
and Q are the nearest and furthest points from the planet, respectively. [59, 19]
Figure 1.2: The satellite is described by three masses, each m/3, connected by springs
each of the same unstrained length, l. [59, 19]
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Figure 1.3: The orbital eccentricity as a function of time [59, 20]
4. initial time step = 10 s
5. total simulation time = 125000 s
6. body chosen as origin = 1
7. tolerance = 100 m
8. initial distance of satellite = 1 x 108 m
9. unstretched length of spring = 1 x 106 m
10. initial eccentricity = 0.6
These parameters set a computer simulation of a satellite of the size of Triton,
the largest moon of Neptune orbiting around a planet with a mass close to Jupiter’s
– including, of course, a specific tidal stress, hysteresis effects, and so forth. If the
parameters were changed, then naturally the simulation is of another phenomenon –
though still of a two-body interaction using Newtonian mechanics.
Here is an extract of the code corresponding to the above mathematical models as
programmed in FORTRAN by Woolfson and Pert.3
PROGRAM NBODY
[...]
C THE VALUES OF A AND E ARE CALCULATED EVERY 100 STEPS
C AND ARE STORED TOGETHER WITH THE TIME.
C
IST=IST+1
IF((IST/100)*100.NE.IST)GOTO 50
IG=IST/100
IF(IG.GT.1000)GOTO 50
C
3For the full code, see [58].
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C FIRST FIND POSITION AND VELOCITY OF CENTRE OF MASS OF THE
C SATELLITE.
C
DO 1 K=1,3
POS(K)=0
VEL(K)=0
DO 2 J=2,NB
POS(K)=POS(K)+X(J,K)
VEL(K)=VEL(K)+V(J,K)
2 CONTINUE
POS(K)=POS(K)/(NB-1.0)
VEL(K)=VEL(K)/(NB-1.0)
1 CONTINUE
C
C CALCULATE ORBITAL DISTANCE
C
R=SQRT(POS(1)**2+POS(2)**2+POS(3)**2)
C
C CALCULATE V**2
C
V2=VEL(1)**2+VEL(2)**2+VEL(3)**2
C
C CALCULATE INTRINSIC ENERGY
C
TOTM=CM(1)+CM(2)+CM(3)+CM(4)
EN=-G*TOTM/R+0.5*V2
[...]
SUBROUTINE START
DIMENSION X(20,3),V(20,3),ASTORE(1000),TSTORE(1000),
+ESTORE(1000),XTEMP(2,20,3),VTEMP(2,20,3),CM(20),XT(20,3),
+VT(20,3),DELV(20,3)
[...]
READ(5,*)NORIG
[...]
C
C INITIAL VELOCITIES ARE CALCULATED FOR THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE
C SATELLITE SO THAT THE SPIN ANGULAR VELOCITY OF THE SATELLITE IS
C APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO THE ORBITAL ANGULAR VELOCITY.
C
VV=SQRT(G*(CM(1)+CM(2)+CM(3)+CM(4))*(1-ECC)/D)
V(2,2)=VV*DIS2/D
V(3,2)=VV*DIS3*COS(ANGLE)/D
[...]
RETURN
END
As discussed earlier, one of the characteristics of the problem-solving viewpoint is
that the above mathematical model can be directly implemented on the computer. That
is to say, that the code shown here corresponds in full extent to the mathematical model.
In principle, nothing – relevant – is added and nothing – relevant – is eliminated. Thus,
the only reason to use a computer is to find the set of solutions of the model in ways
that are faster and cheaper. The description of patterns of behavior viewpoint, on the
other hand, acknowledges the existence of a process for implementing the model as
a computer simulation, which includes to turn the mathematical model into a rather
different kind of model.
As we can see, both positions hold good grounds. The problem-solving viewpoint
is correct in claiming that computer simulations must reflect the mathematical model
implemented, otherwise problems of representation, reliability, and the like emerge.
The description of patterns of behavior viewpoint, on the other hand, reflects scientific
and engineering practice more unambiguously.
Before continuing, here is a good place to introduce some new terminology. Let us
call ‘mathematical models’ those models used in scientific and engineering fields that
make use of mathematical language. Examples of these are the above equations. Let
us call ‘simulation models’ those models implemented on a computer – as a computer
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simulation – which make use of a programming language.4 An example of a simula-
tion model is the code shown above.
I began this chapter making a distinction between two viewpoints of computer sim-
ulations. On the one hand, the problem-solving viewpoint which emphasizes the com-
putational side of simulations; on the other hand, the description of patterns of behavior
viewpoint which places emphasis on the representations of target systems. As men-
tioned before, the problem-solving viewpoint does not neglect the representation of the
target system, nor does the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint fail to consider
computation as a core issue of computer simulations. Neither viewpoint reflect an ‘all
or nothing’ stand – a good example of this is the definition given by Thomas H. Naylor,
Donald S. Burdick, and W. Earl Sasser where they defend a patterns of behavior view-
point on page 1361 of [33] and also subscribe to the problem-solving viewpoint later
on page 1319. The difference between these two viewpoints lies, again, in the main
features highlighted by each account. Let us see if we can make this distinction more
clear.5
1.1.1 Computer simulations as problem-solving techniques
Under the problem-solving viewpoint, computer simulations typically exhibit some of
the following features. First, simulations are adopted for cases where the target system
is too complex to be analyzed on its own – call it the complexity feature. Second,
simulations are useful for cases where the underlying mathematical model cannot be
analytically solved – call it the unanalyticity feature. Third, mathematical models are
directly implemented on the computer – call it the direct implementation feature. The
complexity and unanalyticity features emphasize our human limitations for analyzing
certain kind of mathematical models, at the same time enhancing the computational
power simulations as a virtue. The direct implementation feature accompanies these
ideas by claiming that there is no mediating methodology between the mathematical
model and the physical computer. Rather, equations from the mathematical model
are implemented – or solved – simpliciter on the physical computer in the form of a
computer simulation.
The early literature of the problem-solving viewpoint presents a rather uniform
perspective on the matter. For the most part, professional philosophers, scientists, and
engineers see the computational power of simulations as the key unlocking their epis-
temic power. A good first example is the definition provided by Claude McMillan and
Richard Gonza´les in 1965. In their work, the authors state four characteristic points of
simulations, namely
4Strictly speaking, a simulation model is a more complex structure consisting, among other things, of
a specification coded in a programming language as an algorithm and finally implemented as a computer
process. Although the same specification can be written in different programing languages and implemented
by different computer architectures, they are all considered the same simulation model. Thus understood, the
programming language by itself does not determine the notion of ‘simulation model.’ I shall discuss these
issues in more extent in chapter ??.
5An interesting introduction to the history of computer science can be found in the work of [8, 10, 11],
and particularly on computer simulations [37, 36].
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1. Simulation is a problem solving technique.
2. It is an experimental method.
3. Application of simulation is indicated in the solution of problems of
(a) systems design (b) systems analysis.
4. Simulation is resorted to when the systems under consideration can-
not be analyzed using direct or formal analytical methods. [30]
This definition is, to the extent that I could find, the first that openly conceives
computer simulations as problem-solving techniques. This is not only because the
authors explicitly state so in their first point, but because the definition adopts two
of the three standard feature of this viewpoint. Point 4 is explicit about the use of
simulations for finding solutions to otherwise unsolvable mathematical models, while
point 3 suggests the adoption of simulations for system design and system analysis as
they are too complex to be analyzed by their own (i.e., the complexity feature).
A year later, Daniel Teichroew and John Francis Lubin presented their own defini-
tion. Interestingly, this definition makes three features of this viewpoint more visible
than any other definition in the literature. The authors begin by identifying what they
call ‘simulation problems,’ that is, problems that are treated by simulation techniques
– we shall discuss next what these techniques are. A simulation problem is basically a
mathematical problem with many variables, parameters, and functions that cannot be
treated analytically (i.e., the complexity feature) and thus computer simulations are the
only available resource to researchers (i.e., the unanalyticity feature). The third feature,
direct implementation of a mathematical model, can be found in several places in the
article. In fact, the authors categorize two kinds of models, namely, continuous change
models (i.e., those making use of Partial Differential Equations or Ordinary Differen-
tial Equations) and discrete change models (i.e., those models where changes in the
state of the system are discrete) [49, 724]. To the authors, both kinds of models are
implemented directly as a computer simulation. In the authors’ own words,
Simulation problems are characterized by being mathematically intractable
and having resisted solution by analytic methods. The problems usually
involve many variables, many parameters, functions which are not well-
behaved mathematically, and random variables. Thus, simulation is a tech-
nique of last resort. Yet, much effort is now devoted to ‘computer simula-
tion’ because it is a technique that gives answers in spite of its difficulties,
costs and time required. [49, 724]
There is a further interesting claim to highlight here. Let us notice that the au-
thors make plain the sentiment that advocates of this viewpoint have with regards to
computer simulations: they are a technique of last resort.6 That is to say, the use of
computer simulations is only justified when analytic methods are unavailable. But this
is more an epistemological prejudice against computer simulations than an established
6Regarding this last point, Prof. O¨ren has organized in 1982 a NATO Advanced Study Institute in Ottawa
focused on addressing the context for the uses of computer simulations (personal communication). See for
instance, the articles published in [38, 35].
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truth. Recent work done by philosophers shows that, in many instances, researchers
prefer computer simulations over analytic methods. This, of course, for the obvious
cases when the target system is intractable – as Teichroew and Lubin correctly point
out – and where analytic solutions are not available. Vincent Ardourel and Julie Je-
beile argue that computer simulations might even be superior to analytical solutions
for the purpose of making quantitative predictions. According to these authors, “some
analytical solutions make numerical applications difficult or impossible (...) analyti-
cal solutions are sometimes too sophisticated with respect to the problem at stake (...)
[and] analytical methods do not offer a generic approach for solving equations like
[computer simulations do]”7 [2, 203].
Now, advocates of the problem-solving viewpoint are also present in contemporary
literature. A largely objected definition – which, despite the author’s change of mind
somehow managed to become a standard in the literature – is Humphreys’ working
definition: “A computer simulation is any computer-implemented method for exploring
the properties of mathematical models where analytic methods are unavailable” [24,
501].
Here, Humphreys gives us two features of computer simulations as problem-solvers.
These are, simulations are mathematical models implemented on a computer, and they
are used when analytic methods are unavailable. So far, Humphreys is a classic advo-
cate of the problem-solving technique. A closer look of the definition, however, shows
Humphreys’ worries also include the nature of computation. Here is why.
Earlier, I mentioned that Naylor, Burdick, and Sasser stated that computer sim-
ulations are numerical methods implemented on the computer. Humphreys, instead,
conceives computer simulations as computer-implemented methods. The distinction
is not otiose, since it says something about the nature of computing a model. In fact,
Humphreys urges to keep three different notions separate: numerical mathematics, nu-
merical methods, and numerical analysis. Numerical mathematics is the branch of
mathematics concerned with obtaining numerical values of the solutions to a given
mathematical problem. Numerical methods, on the other hand, are numerical math-
ematics concerned with finding an approximate solution to the model. Finally, nu-
merical analysis is the theoretical analysis of numerical methods and the computed
solutions [24, 502]. Numerical methods, by themselves, cannot directly be related to
computer simulations. At least two additional features must be included. First, nu-
merical methods must be applied to a specific scientific problem. This is important
because the model implemented is not any model, but of a specific kind (i.e., scien-
tific and engineering models). In this way, there is no room for conflating computer
simulations carried out in a scientific facility with computer simulation carried out for
artistic purposes. Second, the method must be implemented on a real computer as well
as computable in real time. This second feature ensures that the model is suitable for
computation and complies with minimal standards of scientific research (e.g., that the
computation ends within a reasonable time-frame, that the results are accurate within a
certain range, etc.)
Despite being suggested only as a working definition, Humphreys received fierce
7The authors identify ‘numerical methods’ with ‘computer simulations’ [2, 202]. As I show next, these
two concepts must remain separate. However, this does not represent an objection to their main claim.
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objections that virtually forced him to change his original position. A chief critic was
Stephan Hartmann, who objected that Humphreys’ definition missed the dynamic na-
ture of computer simulations. Hartmann, then, offered his own definition:
Simulations are closely related to dynamic models. More concretely,
a simulation results when the equations of the underlying dynamic model
are solved. This model is designed to imitate the time-evolution of a real
system. To put it another way, a simulation imitates one process by an-
other process. In this definition, the term “process” refers solely to some
object or system whose state changes in time. If the simulation is run
on a computer, it is called a computer simulation [21, 83 - emphasis in
original].
Simplifying this definition, we could say that a computer simulation consists of
finding the set of solutions to a dynamic model by using a physical computer. Let
us highlight a few interesting assumptions. First, the dynamic model is conceived as
holding no differences from a mathematical model. Thus understood, the model used
by M. M. Wolfson and G. J. Pert for simulating the dynamics of a satellite orbiting
around a planet under tidal stress is the model implemented on the physical computer.
Second, Hartmann is not too worried about which methods are used for solving the
dynamic model. Paper and pencil, numerical methods, and computer-implemented
methods seem to be all equally suitable. This concern stems from taking that the same
dynamic model is solved by a human agent as well as the computer. Similarly to
Naylor, Burdick, and Sasser, such an assumption raises questions about the nature of
computation.
It is interesting to note that Hartmann’s definition has been warmly welcomed by
the philosophical community. The same year, Jerry Banks, John Carson, and Barry
Nelson presented a definition similar to Hartmann’s, also emphasizing the idea of the
dynamics of a process over time, and of representation as imitation. They define it
in the following way “[a] simulation is the imitation of the operation of a real-world
process or system over time. Whether done by hand or on a computer, simulation
involves the generation of an artificial history of a system and the observation of that
artificial history to draw inferences concerning the operating characteristics of the real
system” [3, 3]. Francesco Guala also follows Hartmann in distinguishing between
static and dynamic models, time-evolution of a system, and the use of simulations for
mathematically solving the implemented model [19]. More recently, Wendy Parker has
made explicit reference to it by characterizing a simulation as “a time-ordered sequence
of states that serves as a representation of some other time-ordered sequence of states”
[39, 486].
Now, despite of the differences between Humphreys and Hartmann, they agree on a
few issues as well. In fact, they both consider computer simulations as high-speed cal-
culation equipment capable of enhancing our analytical capacity to solve otherwise un-
solvable mathematical models. After Hartmann’s initial objections, Humphreys coined
a new definition, this time based on the notion of computational template. I shall dis-
cuss templates in the next section, as I believe this new conceptualization of computer
simulations qualifies better for the descriptions of patterns of behavior viewpoint.
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An illuminating summary is found in the work of Roman Frigg and Julian Reiss.
According to the authors, there are two senses in which the notion of computer sim-
ulation is defined in current literature. There is a narrow sense, where “‘simulation’
refers to the use of a computer to solve an equation that we cannot solve analytically,
or more generally to explore mathematical properties of equations where analytical
methods fail”. There is also a broad sense, where the term “‘simulation’ refers to the
entire process of constructing, using, and justifying a model that involves analytically
intractable mathematics” [16, 596]. To me, both senses could be included as part of the
problem-solving techniques viewpoint of computer simulations.
Both categories are certainly meritorious and illuminating. Both generally capture
the many senses in which philosophers of the problem-solving viewpoint define the no-
tion of computer simulation. While the narrow sense focuses on the heuristic capacity
of computer simulations, the broad sense emphasizes the methodological, epistemolog-
ical, and pragmatic aspects of computer simulations as problem-solvers. Let us now
move to a different way to conceptualize computer simulations.
1.1.2 Computer simulations as description of patterns of behavior
The view of computer simulations as problem solving techniques contrasts with the
view of simulations as description of patterns of behavior. Under this view, computer
simulations are primarily concerned with describing the behavior of a target system
to which they develop or unfold. As mentioned before, this is not to say that the
computing power of simulations is downplayed in any sense. Computer simulations
as problem solvers got this point right in the sense that speed, memory, and control
are core factors that emphasize the novelty of simulations in scientific and engineering
practice. However, under this viewpoint, the computational power of simulations is
considered a second-level feature. In this sense, instead of locating the epistemological
value of computer simulations in their capacity for solving a mathematical model, their
value comes from describing patterns of behavior of target systems.
Now, what are patterns? I take them to be descriptions that reflect structures,
attributes, performance, and the general behavior of the target system in a specific
language. More specifically, these structures, attributes, and so on are interpreted as
concepts used in the sciences (e.g., H2O, mass, etc.), causal relationships (e.g., the
collision of two billiard balls), natural and logical necessities (e.g., that no enriched
uranium sphere has a mass greater than 100,000 kilograms8), laws, principles, and
constants of nature. In short, patterns are descriptions of a target system which make
use of the scientific and engineering vocabulary. Naturally, these patterns also rely on
expert knowledge, ‘tricks of the trade’, past experiences, and individual, societal and
institutional preferences. In this sense, for this viewpoint, computer simulations are a
conglomerate of concepts, formulae, and interpretations that facilitate the description
8A clarification is due here. A computer is not technologically impaired to simulate an enriched uranium
sphere with a mass greater than 100,000 kilograms. Rather, the kind of constraints we find in computers
are related to their own physical limitations and those indicated by theories of computation. Now, given that
researchers want to simulate a real target system, they must describe it as accurately as possible. If that target
system is a natural system, such as a uranium sphere, then accuracy dictates that the simulation is limited on
the mass of the sphere.
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of the patterns of behavior of a target system.
The difference in conceptualizing computer simulations in this way, as opposed
to the problem-solving viewpoint, is that the physical features of the computer are no
longer the primary epistemic value of computer simulations. Rather, it is their capacity
to describe patterns of behavior of a target system that carries the burden. Mimicking
the previous section, let us begin with some early definitions.
In 1960, Martin Shubik defined a simulation in the following way:
A simulation of a system or an organism is the operation of a model
or simulator which is a representation of the system or organism. (...) The
operation of the model can be studied and, from it, properties concerning
the behavior of the actual system or its subsystem can be inferred. [47,
909]
Shubik is highlighting two main features that are at the heart of this view. That is,
that a simulation is a representation or description of the behavior of a target system,
and that properties of such a target system can be inferred. The first feature is central
to this viewpoint, to the extent that it gives the name to it. Emphasizing the repre-
sentational capacity of simulations, as opposed to mathematical models, suggests that
they are somehow different. As we shall see later, this difference lies in the number of
transformations under which a mathematical model – or rather, a series of mathematical
models – go through in order to result in a computer simulation. The second feature, on
the other hand, highlights the use of computer simulations as proxies for understand-
ing something about the target system. This is to say that researchers are capable of
inferring properties of the target system based on the results of the simulation.
Both features, we must notice, are absent in the problem-solving viewpoint. The
contrary, however, is not true. As mentioned earlier, understanding computer sim-
ulations this way does not disavow some claims of the problem solving techniques
viewpoint. In particular, the capacity of computing complex models is a characteristic
of computer simulations usually present in all definitions. For instance, Shubik says:
“The model is amenable to manipulations which would be impossible, too expensive
or impracticable to perform on the entity it portrays” [47, 909]. It is interesting to
note that, as we move forward in time, concerns about the computational power tend
to disappear.
Almost two decades later, in 1979, G. Birtwistle formulated the following definition
for computer simulations:
Simulation is a technique for representing a dynamic system by a
model in order to gain information about the underlying system. If the
behaviour of the model correctly matches the relevant behaviour character-
istics of the underlying system, we may draw inferences about the system
from experiments with the model and thus spare ourselves any disasters.
[7, 1]
Similarly to what Teichroew and Lubin presented with the problem-solving view-
point, Birtwistle is also making plain the chief features of the description of patterns of
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behavior viewpoint. From the above definition it is clear that central to computer simu-
lations is the representation of a target system; provided the right representation, then,
researchers can draw inferences about such target system. Let us also note that, unlike
Teichroew and Lubin who consider computer simulations a last resource, to Birtwistle
it is a crucial piece in scientific research that helps to prevent disasters. The opposite
attitudes towards computer simulations cannot find two better representatives.
Another definition worth mentioning comes from Robert E. Shannon, an industrial
engineer who has worked very profusely on clarifying the nature of computer simula-
tions (see his work from [44] and [45]).
We will define simulation as the process of designing a model of a real
system and conducting experiments with this model for the purpose of
understanding the behavior of the system and/or evaluating various strate-
gies for the operation of the system. Thus it is critical that the model be
designed in such a way that the model behavior mimics the response be-
havior of the real system to events that take place over time. [46, 7]
Again we can see how Shannon highlights the importance of representing a target
system, as well as the ability to infer – and evaluate – our knowledge from computer
simulations. What is perhaps the most outstanding aspect of Shannon’s definition is the
marked emphasis on the methodology of computer simulations. To him, it is critical
that the model in the simulation mimics the behavior of the target system. It is not
enough, as it is found in other authors, that the model correctly describes the relevant
behavior of the target system. Attention must be given to the way in which the simu-
lation is designed, because it is there where we will find grounds – and problems – for
drawing inferences about the target system.
These latter ideas continue, more or less successfully, in the subsequent literature
related to this viewpoint. A good example is Paul Humphreys’ 2004 book, where he
presents a detailed account of the methodology of computer simulations. Eric Wins-
berg, a few years later, also made an interesting effort to show the ways in which design
decisions affect epistemological evaluations. According to Winsberg, present and past
design decisions ground our confidence in the results of computer simulations. Let us
now discuss their positions in more detail.9
Earlier, I mentioned that in 1990 Humphreys elaborated on a working definition for
computer simulations. In spite of having presented it only as a working definition, he
received vigorous objections that virtually forced him to change his original viewpoint
on computer simulations. One of the chief critics was Stephan Hartmann, who pointed
out that his working definition missed the dynamic nature of computer simulations. Af-
ter Hartmann’s initial objections, Humphreys coined a new definition, this time based
on the notion of computational model.
According to his new characterization, computer simulations rely on an underlying
computational model that involves representations of a target system. At first glance,
9There are many other contemporary authors that deserves our attention. Most prominently is the work
of Claus Beisbart, who takes computer simulations as arguments [5]. That is, an inferential structure en-
compassing a premise and a conclusion. Another interesting case is Rawad El Skaf and Cyrille Imbert [14],
who conceptualize computer simulations as ‘unfolding scenarios.’ Unfortunately, space does not allow me
to discuss these authors in more extent.
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this definition looks very much like the standard definitions discussed so far. However,
the devil is in the details. In order to fully appreciate Humphreys’ turn, we must dissect
his definition of computational model, understood as the sextuple:
<computational template, construction assumptions, correction set,
interpretation, initial justification, output representation>10
A computational template is, in fact, the result of a computationally tractable theo-
retical template. A theoretical template, in turn, is the kind of very general mathemati-
cal description that can be found in a scientific work. This includes partial differential
equations, such as elliptic (e.g., Laplace’s equation), parabolic (e.g., the diffusion equa-
tion), hyperbolic (e.g., the wave equation), and ordinary differential equations, among
others. An illuminating example of a theoretical template is Newton’s Second Law,
for it describes a very general constraint on the relationship between forces, mass,
and acceleration. The core characteristic of theoretical templates is that researchers
could specify them in a number of different ways. For instance, the force function in
Newton’s Second Law could either be a gravitational force, an electrostatic force, a
magnetic force, or any other kind of force.
Now, a computational template cannot simply be picked out from the theoretical
template. This is the kind of feature that drives the solving-problem viewpoint, but not
the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint. To the latter viewpoint, there is an
entire methodology that mediates between the computational model and the theoretical
model that needs to be explored. Concretely, the process of construction of a template
involves a number of idealizations, abstractions, constraints, and approximations of the
target system for which researchers needs to account. Moreover, at some point the
computational template needs to be validated against data. What happens when it fails
to fit those data? Well, the answer is that researchers have a series of well-established
methods for correcting the computational template in order to ensure accurate results.
According to Humphreys, the construction assumptions and correction set – compo-
nents two and three in the sextuple – fulfill precisely these roles. Without them, the
computational template might not even be computable.
Now, in order to have an accurate representation of the target system, the variables,
functions, and the like in the computational template need to be given an interpreta-
tion. For example, in the first derivation of a diffusion equation, the interpretation of
the function representing the temperature gradient in a perfectly insulated cylindrical
conductor is central to the decision on whether the diffusion equation correctly rep-
resents the flow of heat in a given metal bar [25, 80]. The researcher’s interpretation
of the computational template constitute part of the justification for adopting certain
equations, values, and functions. The computational templates, says Humphreys, are
“not mere conjectures but objects for which a separate justification for each idealiza-
tion, approximation, and physical principle is often available, and those justifications
transfer to the use of the template.” [25, 81].
Finally, the output representation, that is, the visualization of computational model,
comes in different flavors. It can be a data array, functions, matrix, and more important
10For details, see [25, 102-103]
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in terms of understanding, dynamic representations such as videos or interactive visu-
alizations. As we will discuss in detail in section ??, visualizations play a fundamental
role in our epistemic gain using computer simulations, and thus in their general success
as novel methods in scientific and engineering research.
Eric Winsberg is the second philosopher on our list. According to him, there are
two core characteristics that meaningfully distinguish computer simulations from other
forms of calculation. First, much effort goes into setting up the model that serve as the
basis for computer simulations, as well as to deciding which simulation results are
reliable and which are not. Second, computer simulations make use of a variety of
techniques and methods that facilitate drawing inference from results [54]. As dis-
cussed earlier in this section, these two characteristics are typical from the description
of patterns of behavior viewpoint.
Furthermore, Winsberg correctly points out that the construction of computer sim-
ulations are guided, but not determined, by theory. This means that, although computer
simulations rely on theoretical background, they typically encompass elements that are
not directly related to, nor are part of, theories. A case of this are ‘fictionalizations,’
that is, contrary-to-fact principles that are included in the simulation model with the
purpose of increasing the reliability and trustworthiness of its results. As we saw ear-
lier, Humphreys made a similar point with the construction assumptions and correction
set. Winsberg then illustrates fictionalizations with two examples, ‘artificial viscosity’
and ‘vorticity confinement.’ In simulations of fluid dynamics, these techniques are suc-
cessfully used despite not offering realistic accounts of the nature of fluids. Why are
they used then? There are several reasons, including of course that they are largely part
of the practice of model-building techniques on fluid dynamics. Other reasons include
the fact that these fictionalizations facilitate the calculation of crucial effects that would
otherwise be lost, and that without these fictionalizations, the results of simulations on
fluid dynamics could neither be accurate nor justified.
The previous discussions show that it is simply not possible to fit the concept of
computer simulations into one conceptual corset. Thus, our initial question: ‘what
are computer simulations?’ cannot be uniquely answered. It seems that, ultimately,
it will depend on the commitments of the practitioners. Whereas the problem-solving
viewpoint is more interested in finding solution to complex models, the description
of patterns of behavior viewpoint is concerned with accurately representing a target
system. Both offer good conceptualizations of computer simulations, and both have
several problems to face. Let us next discuss three different kinds of computer simula-
tions found in the scientific and engineering practice.
1.1.3 Kinds of computer simulations
Before addressing the different classes of computer simulations, let us briefly discuss
a short classification of target systems typically associated with computer simulations.
This classification, besides being non-exhaustive – or precisely because of this – holds
no expectations of being unique. Other ways of characterizing target systems – along
with the models that represent such target systems – can lead to a new and improved
taxonomy.
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Having mentioned all the usual warnings, let us begin with the most familiar of all
target systems, that is, empirical target systems. These are empirical phenomena – or
real-world phenomena – in all forms and flavors. Examples include microwave back-
ground radiation and Brownian movement in astronomy and physics, social segregation
in sociology, competition among vendors in economy, and scramjets in engineering,
among many others examples.
Understandably, empirical target systems are the most pervasive target system in
computer simulation. This is chiefly because researchers are seriously engaged in un-
derstanding the empirical world, and computer simulations provide a new and success-
ful method for achieving such aims. Now, in order to represent empirical target sys-
tems, computer simulations implement models that theoretically underpin real-world
phenomena with the help of laws, principles, and theories accepted by the scientific
community. The Newtonian model of planetary movement, for instance, describes the
behavior of any two bodies interacting with each other by a handful of laws and princi-
ples. Unfortunately, not every empirical target system can be so simply and accurately
represented.
More commonly, computer simulations represent real-world phenomena by includ-
ing a plethora of elements from different – and sometimes incompatible – sources.
Take for instance scramjets, combustion ramjets in which combustion takes place in
supersonic airflow. The use of Navier-Stoke equations are typically at the base of sim-
ulations of fluid dynamics. However, the intake of a scramjet compresses the incoming
air via a series of shock waves generated by the specific shape of the intake along
with the high flight velocity, as opposed to other air-breathing vehicles that compress
the incoming air by compressors – or other moving parts. Simulations of scramjets,
then, cannot be fully characterized by Navier-Stoke equations. Instead, the laminar
and turbulent boundary layers, along with the interaction with shock waves, yields a
three-dimensional unsteady complex flow pattern. A reliable simulation of what is
happening within the intake is, then, accomplished by means of high fidelity direct nu-
merical simulations and large eddy simulations. It is the model design, programmed,
and built by the engineers, and not just the Navier-Stoke equations, that permits a reli-
able simulation [4].11
Another important target system is the so-called hypothetical target system. These
are target systems where no empirical phenomena are described. Rather, they are either
theoretical or imaginary. A theoretical target system describes systems or processes
within the universe provided by a theory, whether mathematical (e.g., a torus), physical
(e.g., air resistance equal to zero), or biological (e.g., infinite populations). Take as
example the famous problem of the Seven Bridges of Ko¨nigsberg,12 or the Traveling
Salesman Problem.13 Thus understood, the target system is not empirical, but instead
11I should also mention that there are several other contrivances also involved in the design and program-
ming of computer simulations. In this respect, section ?? presents and discusses some of them, such as
calibration procedures, and verification and validation methods.
12The problem can be best described as finding a way to cross each of the seven bridges of the city of
Ko¨nigsberg only once. The problem, solved by Euler in 1735, laid the foundations of graph theory.
13The Travelling Salesman Problem describes a salesman who must travel between N number of cities
and keep the travel costs as low as possible. The problem consists in finding the best optimization of the the
salesman’s route.
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it has the properties of a mathematical or a logical system. A computer simulation
implementing these models is mostly theoretical in essence, and it is typically designed
for exploring the underlying properties of the model.
Imaginary target systems, on the other hand, stand for non-existing, imagined sce-
narios. For instance, an epidemic outbreak of influenza in Europe counts as such a
target system. This is because such a scenario is prone to never exist, although it
does not mean that it will never happen. A simulation of such a scenario provides
researchers the necessary understanding of the dynamics of an epidemic outbreak for
planning prevention measures and containment protocols, as well as for training per-
sonnel. Imaginary systems can be, in turn, divisible into two further kinds, namely,
contingent and impossible [53]. The former stands for a scenario that, as a matter of
contingent fact, does not exist. The latter stands for a scenario that is nomologically
impossible. The simulation of an epidemic outbreak is a case in point of the former,
while running a simulation that violates the known laws of nature is an example of the
latter.
The first thing to note about this classification is that computer simulations could
represent one target system but render results of another target system. This is a com-
mon ‘jumping’ mechanism that could be harmless, or that could cast a shadow of
doubt on the results. A simple example will show how this is possible. Consider
simulating the planetary movement implementing a Newtonian model; now instantiate
G = 2m3kg−1s−2 as an initial condition. The example shows a simulation that initially
implements an empirical target system, but renders results of a nomologically impos-
sible imaginary target system. To the best of our current knowledge of the universe,
there is no such gravitational constant. As a consequence, the results of a simulation
which in principle should have been sanctioned empirically (e.g., by validating against
empirical data) can only be confirmed theoretically.14
In a way, these issues are part of the general charm and malleability of using com-
puter simulations, but they need to be taken seriously by philosophers and sociologists
science. Having said this, and looking closely at the practice of computer simulation,
one could sees how researchers have a few ‘tricks’ that help to cope with situations like
‘jumping’. For instance, one solution to the simulation of the satellite under tidal stress
would be to set G as a global constant of value 6.67384x10−11m3kg−1s−2. Unfortu-
nately, this is only a palliative solution since the value of the variable mass of satellite
could be set to any unrealistically large value. Again, researchers could establish lower
and upper limits on the size of the satellite and planet mass, but this solution only begs
the question if there is not another way to ‘fool the simulation’.
Either by modeling or by instantiation, computer simulations can create several
scenarios out of the mind of researchers. How do researchers turn this seemingly dis-
astrous situation into something advantageous? The answer is, I believe, in the way
scientists and engineers sanction computer simulations as reliable processes. That is,
by providing reasons for believing that computer simulations are a reliable process
which renders, most of the time, correct results. I will explore these issues in more
detail in chapter ??.
14Running a second computer simulation that could confirm these results is becoming standard practice
[1].
34 CHAPTER 1. THE UNIVERSE OF COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
Along with a classification of target systems, I now suggest a classification of com-
puter simulations. In the same spirit, this classification is not meant to be exhaustive,
conclusive, nor unique. Here, I divide simulations into three classes, based on the
standard treatment that computer simulations have received from the specialized litera-
ture [55]). These are cellular automaton, agent-based simulations, and equation-based
simulations.
1.1.4 Cellular automata
Cellular automata are the first of our examples of computer simulations. They were de-
vised in the 1940s by Stanislaw Ulam and John von Neumann while Ulam was study-
ing the growth of crystals using a simple lattice network as a model, and von Neumann
was working on the problem of self-replicating systems. The story goes that Ulam sug-
gested to von Neumann to use the same kind of lattice network as his, creating in this
way a two-dimensional, self-replicator algorithm.
Cellular automata are simple forms of computer simulations. Such simplicity stems
from both their programming and underlying conceptualization. A standard cellular
automaton is an abstract mathematical system where space and time are considered to
be discrete; it consists of a regular grid of cells, each of which can be in any state at a
given time. Typically all the cells are governed by the same rule, which describes how
the state of a cell at a given time is determined by the states of itself and its neighbors
at the preceding moment. Stephen Wolfram defines cellular automata in the following
way:
[...] mathematical models for complex natural systems containing large
numbers of simple identical components with local interactions. They
consist of a lattice of sites, each with a finite set of possible values. The
value of the sites evolve synchronously in discrete time steps according to
identical rules. The value of a particular site is determined by the previous
values of a neighborhood of sites around it. [57, 1]
Although a rather general characterization of this class of computer simulation, the
above definition already provides the first ideas as to their domain of applicability. Cel-
lular automata have been successfully used for modeling many areas in social dynamics
(e.g., behavioral dynamics for cooperative activities), biology (e.g., patterns of some
seashells), and chemical types (e.g., the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction).
One of the simplest and most canonical examples of cellular automata is Conway’s
Game of Life. The simulation is remarkable because it provides a case of emergence of
patterns and self-organization dynamics of some systems. In this simulation, a cell can
only survive if there are either two or three other living cells in its immediate neigh-
borhood. Without these companions, the rule indicates that the cell dies either from
overcrowding, if it has too many living neighbors, or from loneliness, if it has too few.
A dead cell can make its way back to life provided that there are exactly three living
neighbors. In truth, there is little interaction – as one would expect from a game – be-
sides creating an initial configuration and observing how it evolves. Nevertheless, from
a theoretical point of view, the Game of Life can compute any computable algorithm,
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Figure 1.4: Rule 30. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CellularAutomaton.html
Figure 1.5: Pattern created by Rule 30. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CellularAutomaton.html
making it a remarkable example of a universal Turing machine. Back in 1970, Con-
way’s Game of Life open up a new field of mathematical research: the field of cellular
automata [17].
Elementary cellular automata furnishes some fascinating cases in contemporary
science. The idea of these automata is that they are based on an infinite one-dimensional
array of cells with only two states. At discrete time intervals, every cell changes state
based on its current state and the state of its two neighbors. Rule 30 is a case in point
which produces complex, seemingly random patterns from simple, well-defined rules
(see figure 1.4). For instance, a pattern resembling Rule 30 appears on the shell of cone
snail species Conus textile (see figure 1.5). Other examples are based on it’s mathemat-
ical properties, such as using Rule 30 as a random number generator for programming
languages, and as a possible stream cipher for use in cryptography. The rule set which
governs the next state of Rule 30 is shown in figure 1.4.
Cellular automata entrench a set of unique methodological and epistemological
virtues. To name a few, they accommodate better to error because they render exact
results of the model they implement. Since approximations with the target system are
almost nonexistent, any disagreement between the model and the empirical data can be
ascribed directly to the model that realized the set of rules. Another epistemological
virtue is pointed out by Evelyn Fox-Keller, who explains that cellular automata lack
theoretical underpinning in the familiar sense of the term. That is, “what is to be simu-
lated is neither a well-established set of differential equations [...] nor the fundamental
physical constituents (or particles) of the system [...] but rather the phenomenon itself”
[15, 208]. Approximations, idealizations, abstractions and the like are concepts that
worry the practitioner of cellular automata very little.
Now, not everything is great for cellular automata. They have been criticized on
several grounds. One of these criticisms touches upon the metaphysical assumptions
behind this class of simulation. It is not clear, for instance, that the natural world is
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actually a discrete place, as assumed by the cellular automata. Many of today’s scien-
tific and engineering work is based on the description of a continuous world. On less
speculative grounds, it is a fact that cellular automata have little presence in scientific
and engineering fields. The reason for this, I believe, is partly cultural. The physi-
cal sciences are still the accepted viewpoint for describing the natural world, and they
are written in the language of Partial Differential Equations and Ordinary Differential
Equations (PDE and ODE respectively).
Naturally, advocates of cellular automata focus their efforts to show their relevance.
In all fairness, many cellular automata are more adaptable and structurally similar to
empirical phenomena than PDEs and ODEs [56, vii]. It has been pointed out by Annick
Lesne, a renown theoretical physicist, that discrete and continuous behavior coexist in
many natural phenomena, depending on the scale of observation. To her mind, this is
an indicator not only of the metaphysical basis of many natural phenomena, but also
of the suitability of cellular automata for scientific and engineering research [29]. In a
similar vein, Ge´rard Vichniac believes that cellular automata seek not only numerical
agreement with a physical system, but also they attempt to match the simulated sys-
tem’s own structure, its topology, its symmetries and its ‘deep’ properties [52, 113].
Tommaso Toffoli has a similar stand as these authors, to the point that he entitled a
paper: “Cellular automata as an alternative to (rather than an approximation of) dif-
ferential equations in modeling physics” [50], highlighting cellular automata as the
natural replacement of differential equations in physics.
Despite these and many other authors’ efforts to show that the world might be more
adequately described by cellular automata, the majority of scientific and engineering
disciplines have not made a complete shift yet. Most of the work done in these dis-
ciplines is predominantly based on agent-based and equation-based simulations. As
mentioned before, in the natural sciences and engineering, most physical and chemical
theories used in astrophysics, geology, climate change, and the like implement PDE
and ODE, two systems of equations that are at the basis of equation-based simulations.
Social and economic systems, on the other hand, are better described and understood
by means of agent-based simulations.
1.1.5 Agent-based simulations
While there is no general agreement on the definition of the nature of an ‘agent’, the
term typically refers to self-contained programs that control their own actions based on
the perceptions of the operating environment. In other words, agent-based simulations
‘intelligently’ interact with their peers as well as their environment.
The relevant characteristic of these simulations is that they show how the total be-
havior of a system emerges from the collective interaction of their parts. To deconstruct
these simulations into their constituent elements would remove the added value that has
been provided in the first place by the computation of the agents. It is a fundamental
characteristic of these simulations, then, that the interplay of the various agents and the
environment brings about a unique behavior of the entire system.
Good examples of agent-based simulations proceed from the social and behavioral
sciences, where they are heavily present. Perhaps the most well-known example of an
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Figure 1.6: Initial random distribution of agents in a checkerboard 13 rows x 16
columns, with a total of 208 squares. [42, 155]
agent-based simulation is Schelling’s Model of Social Segregation.15 A very simple
description of Schelling’s model consists in two groups of agents living in a 2-D16, n
x m matrix ‘checkerboard’ where agents are placed randomly. Each individual agent
has a 3 x 3 neighborhood, which is evaluated by a utility function that indicates the
migration criteria. That is, the set of rules that indicates how to relocate – if possible –
in case of discontent by an agent (see Fig. 1.6)
Schelling’s segregation model is a canonical example of agent-based simulations.17
But more complex agent-based simulations can be found in the literature. It is now
standard that researchers model different attributes, preferences, and overall behavior
into the agents. Nigel Gilbert and Klaus Troitzsch list the set of attributes that are
typically modeled by agents [18]:
1. Knowledge and belief : Since agents base their actions on their interaction with
their environment as well as other agents, it is crucial to be able to model their
system of beliefs. The traditional distinction between knowledge, as true jus-
tified belief, and mere belief can then be modeled. Those whose information
15Although nowadays Schelling’s model is carried out by computers, Schelling himself warned against
its use for understanding the model. Instead, he used coins or other elements to show how segregation
occurred. In this respect, Schelling says: “I cannot too strongly urge you to get the nickels and pennies and
do it yourself. I can show you an outcome or two. A computer can do it for you a hundred times, testing
variations in neighborhood demands, overall ratios, sizes of neighborhoods, and so forth. But there is nothing
like tracing it through for yourself and seeing the process work itself out. It takes about five minutes – no
more time than it takes me to describe the result you would get” [42, 85]. Schelling’s warning against the
use of computers is an amusing anecdote that illustrates how scientists could sometimes fail in predicting the
role of computers in their own respective fields.
16Schelling also introduced a 1-D version, with a population of 70 agents, with the four nearest neigh-
bors on either side, the preference consists of not being minority, and the migration rule is that whoever is
discontent moves to the nearest point that meets her demands [42, 149].
17In truth, depending on how the Schelling model is design and programmed, it could also qualify as an
Cellular Automata. Thank you Andre´s Ilcˇic´ for pointing this out to me.
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might be faulty or plain false must be modeled to act in their environment in a
rather different way than those agents whose information is correct, as a result
of knowing.
2. Inference: Knowledge and belief are possible because agents are able to infer in-
formation from their own set of beliefs. Such inferences are modeled in different
ways, sometimes over very intuitive assumptions. For instance, agent A could
infer that a source of ‘food’ is near agent B knowing – or simply believing – that
agent B has ‘eaten some food.’
3. Goals: Since agents are, for the most part, programed as autonomous entities,
they are typically driven by some sort of goals. Survival is a good example of
this, as it might require the satisfaction of subsidiary goals, such as acquiring
sources of energy, food, and water, as well as avoiding any dangers. Modeling
these subsidiary goals is not easy, since researchers must decide on how to weigh
the importance and relevance among several goals. Different design decisions
lead to different goal-guided agents, and therefore to a different overall behavior
of the system. Let us note that the goals of an agent are a different attribute
from knowing and inferring. Whereas the former are about guiding the general
behavior of the agents in their environment, the latter depends on valid or true
information for ruling their behavior.
4. Planning: In order to satisfy its goals, an agent needs to have some way of
determining what decisions are best. Typically, a set of condition-action rules
are programed as constituent of the agent. For instance, a utility function is
programed for the satisfaction of an energy source and for what counts as a
‘danger.’ Planning involves inferring what actions lead to a desired goal, what
state is required before that action takes place, and what actions are needed to
arrive at the desired state. In this respect, planning is very sophisticated as the
agent needs to weigh several options, including having a ‘pay-off’ rule over their
decisions, determining where it needs to be at some point in the future, and the
like. It has been objected that agent planning is not realistic of human planning
because most human action is driven by routine decisions, an inherent tendency
to discern, and even instinctive judgments that cannot be modeled by a calculated
plan.
5. Language: Passing information across agents is central for any agent-based sim-
ulation. An exciting example is Alexis Drogoul and Jacques Ferber’s multi-agent
model of ants’ colonies [12]. According to the authors, agents can communicate
by propagating a ‘stimuli’ to the environment. This stimuli might be received
and transmitted in different ways. When ants receive this stimuli, they activate a
friendly behavior. However, when a predator receives the stimuli, it triggers an
aggressive behavior. In this particular agent-based simulation, such a communi-
cation mechanism is very simple and by no means aims at conveying any mean-
ing. Other examples of modeling language in agent-based simulations are the
negotiation of contracts [48], communication of decisions, and even one agent
threatening another with ‘death’ [18].
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6. Social models: Some agent-based simulations, like Schelling’s segregation model
discussed earlier, aim at modeling the interrelationship between agents in a larger
environment. On this account, agents are able to create their own topology given
the set of rules, their interaction with other agents, and the initial setup, among
other parameters. For instance, in Schelling’s segregation model, the agents cre-
ate different topologies of segregation given the side of the grid, the utility func-
tion, and the initial position of the agents.
1.1.6 Equation-based simulations
Perhaps the most commonly used class of computer simulations in science and en-
gineering are the so-called equation-based simulations. At their basis, they are the
implementation of a mathematical model on the physical computer which describes a
target system. Because most of our understanding of the world comes through the use
of mathematical descriptions, these simulations are by far the most popular in scientific
and engineering fields. Naturally, examples abound. Fluid dynamics, solid mechanics,
structural dynamic, shock wave physics, and molecular chemistry, are just a handful of
cases. William Oberkampf, Timothy G. Trucano, and Charles Hirsch have elaborated
on an extensive list that they deem to call ‘computational engineering’ and ‘compu-
tational physics’ [34]. Let us note that their labeling emphasizes simulations only in
physics and engineering fields. Although it is correct to say that the overwhelming
majority of equation-based simulations can be found in these domains, it does not do
justice to the myriad of simulations also found in other scientific fields. To extend the
examples, the Solow-Swan model of economic growth is a case in economy, and the
Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey works for sociology as well as for biology.
As mentioned, this class of simulations implement mathematical models on the
computer. But, is that simply so? From section 1.1 we learned that this way of think-
ing corresponds to the problem-solving viewpoint of computer simulation. According
to its advocates, there is little that mediates between the mathematical model and its
implementation on the computer as a computer simulation. The opposite view, the de-
cription of pattern of behavior viewpoint, takes it that there is in fact a methodology
that facilitates the implementation of – a multiplicity of – mathematical models into
the computer. To have a better grasp of a typical equation-based simulation – and to
determine which viewpoint is closer to the actual practices –, let us briefly analyze an
example of a recent simulation on the age of the Sahara desert.
Zhongshi Zhang et al. believed that the Sahara desert emerged during the Tortonian
stage – approximately 7-11 million years ago – of the Late Miocene epoch after a
period of aridity in the north African region [60] . To prove their hypothesis, Zhang’s
team decided to simulate the climate change in these regions on geological timescales
and over the past 30 million years. The Sahara’s age, according to the simulation is, in
effect, of about 7 to 11 million years old. With this result in hand, Zhang’s et al. were
able to oppose most of the standard estimations of the age of the Sahara, which take it
to be about 2–3 million years old at the onset of the Quaternary ice ages. How did they
actually simulate such a complex empirical system?
First, the authors do not implement one grand model of climate change on the com-
puter and calculate it until obtaining the results. This is the problem-solving viewpoint
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that understand computer simulations solely as means for computation. Computer sim-
ulations are much like a laboratory workbench, where scientists subtly combine pieces
of theory, with bits of data, and a lot of expertise knowledge and instinct. The process
is in fact complex, messy, and in many cases non-standardized. Zhang’s team made
use of a family of models, each performing different tasks and representing a different
aspect of the target system. They made use of low- and high-resolution versions of the
Norwegian Earth System Model (NorESM-L) for accounting for the series of geologic
epochs, and the Community Atmosphere Model version 4 (CAM4) as the atmosphere
component of NorESM-L. In fact, the NorESM-L model is in itself a hierarchy of small
models – or mere components of a larger model – representing the land, sea ice, the
ocean, etc.
There is, in truth, no grand model that could tell us about the age of the Sahara.
Instead, a patchwork of models – some known and well-established, some speculative
– laws, principles, data, and bits of theory is what conform Zhang team’s simulation.
This should come as no surprise, as it is generally assumed that there is no general
theory that either underpins or guides computer simulations. Moreover, simulations
typically include non-linguistic information, such as design decisions, possible model
bias, identified uncertainties, and “not included in this model” disclaimers. Bentsen et
al., when describing CAM4, furnish a good example of such a disclaimer: “[a]erosol
indirect effects on mixed-phase and ice clouds (e.g. [23] are not included in the current
version of CAM4-Oslo” [6, 689]).
Despite their lack of full theoretical underpinning, these simulations are still highly
reliable as they represent a specific target system and are typically validated by standard
verification and validation methods (see section ??). In this respect, Zhang et al. are
constantly reminding us that the model performs well in simulating the pre-industrial
climate, that CAM4 simulate the patterns of modern African rainfall reasonably well,
and other similar confirmatory stances of the models. Such reminders, of course, can-
not stop objections against the results of the simulation. In particular, critics of Zhang’s
work point out the lack of evidence for validating their results. Stefan Kro¨pelin is a
chief detractor of using computer simulations for these kinds of target system. He ad-
mits that, although the model is interesting, it is mainly “numerical speculation based
on almost non-existent geological evidence (...) Nothing you can find in the Sahara is
older than 500,000 years, and in terms of Saharan climate even our knowledge of the
past 10,000 is full of gaps” [27]. The response by Zhang et al. is that the evidence for
the early onset of the Saharan aridity is highly contentious. Mathieu Schuster also dis-
agrees with Kro¨pelin’s interpretation of data. According to him, “although it is true that
too little is known about the ancient geology of the region [...] the 2006 Chad study [...]
as well as the ones that reported increases in dust and pollen from sediment, contained
‘strong pieces of evidence to support our new findings”’ [43]. In fact, the simulation
by Zhang and his team come to support some claims already in the literature. Anil
Gupta and his team claim an increased upwelling in the Indian Ocean about 7 to 8
million years ago [20]; and Gilles Ramstein and his team used modeling experiments
to show Eurasian summer temperatures increase in response to the Tethys shrinkage,
which would also enhance the monsoon circulation [40].
To state that computer simulations are unreliable, or that their results do not corre-
late to the way the world is requires more than just a claim that there is no ‘evidence’
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that supports the unreliability of the simulation.18 Other indicators of reliability play
a central role as well. For instance, the ability of the simulation to explain and predict
direct or related phenomena. According to Zhang et al., their simulation shows that
the African summer monsoon was drastically weakened by the Tethys Sea shrinking
during the Tortonian stage, allowing the alteration of the mean climate of the region.
Such climatic change, the researchers speculate, “probably caused the shifts in Asian
and African flora and fauna observed during the same period, with possible links to
the emergence of early hominis in north Africa” [60, 401]. Interestingly enough, re-
searchers could reach such a conclusion only by means of running computer simula-
tions.
Allow me to finish this section with a short description of the general computational
methods for solving the equation-based simulations. Depending on the problem and
the availability of resources, one or more of the following methods apply: analytical
methods, numerical analysis and stochastic techniques.
• Exact solutions: this is the simplest method of all. It consists of carrying out
the operations specified in the simulation in a similar fashion as a mathemati-
cian would do using pen and paper. That is, if the simulation consist in adding
2+2, then the result must be 4 – as opposed to an approximate solution. Com-
puters have the same capacity to find the exact solutions to certain operations
as any other computational mechanism, including our brain. The efficacy of
this method depends, however, on whether the size of the ‘word’ in a computer
is large enough for carrying out the mathematical operation.19 If the operation
exceeds its size, then round-off and truncation mechanisms intervene for the op-
eration to be possible, though with a loss in accuracy.
• Computer-implemented numerical methods: this method refers to computer-
implemented methods for calculating the simulation model by approximation.
Although mathematical studies on numerical analysis predate the use of com-
puters, they gain importance with the introduction of computers for scientific
and engineering purposes. These methods are used for solving PDE and ODE
equations, and include linear interpolation, the Runge-Kutta method, the Adams-
Moulton method, Lagrange interpolation polynomial, Gaussian elimination, and
Euler’s method, among others. Let it be noted that each method is used for solv-
ing a specific kind of PDE and ODE, depending on how many derivatives involve
the unknown function of n variables.
• Stochastic techniques: for higher order dimensions, both exact solutions and
computer-implemented numerical methods become prohibitively expensive in
terms of computational time and resources. Stochastic techniques rely on meth-
ods that use pseudo-random numbers; that is, numbers generated by a numerical
18This is especially true for the traditional sense of ‘evidence’ (i.e., empirically based) that Kro¨pelin refers
to. Other forms of evidence also include results of well-established simulations, verification and validation,
convergence of solutions, etc.
19A ‘word’ represents the minimum unit of data used by a particular computer architecture. It is a fixed
sized group of bits that are handled as a unit by the processor.
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engine.20 The most famous stochastic method is the Monte Carlo method, which
is particularly useful for simulating systems with many coupled degrees of free-
dom such as fluids, disordered materials, strongly coupled solids, and cellular
structures, to mention a few.
1.2 Concluding remarks
This chapter had the sole purpose of addressing the question ‘what is a computer sim-
ulation?’ This is of course an important question, since it sets the grounds for much of
what is discussed about computer simulations later in this book. For this reason, the
first part of the chapter deals with some historical remarks about the many attempts
to define computer simulations, whether offered by engineers, scientists or philoso-
phers. In this context, I distinguished two kinds of definitions. Those that emphasize
the computing power of computer simulations – called the problem-solving technique
viewpoint – and those that take computer simulations to have, as a chief feature, the
capacity to represent a given target system – called description of patterns of behavior
viewpoint. Although there are a handful of definitions where both viewpoints are com-
bined, and arguably one that does not fit with our distinction, in general researchers
across fields agree on conceptualizing computer simulations as one or the other view-
point.
The second part of this chapter dealt with three different kinds of computer simula-
tions, as standardly found in the literature. These are, cellular automata, agent-based
simulations, and equation-based simulations. As warned, this is neither an exhaus-
tive taxonomy nor offers a unique classification. It could be relatively simple to show
how an agent-based simulation could be interpreted as cellular automata (e.g., when
focused on their nature as agents/cells), or as an equation-based simulation (e.g., if the
inner structure of an agent are equations). The key is to see which characteristic of the
computer simulation is highlighted. Here, I offer some criteria for a sound characteri-
zation of each type. A final warning is issued, however, regarding the methodology and
epistemology tailored to each kind. It is not difficult to show that each kind of computer
simulation entails specific and distinct methodological and epistemological concerns,
and therefore they require a different treatment in their own way. In the reminder of
this book, I focus my attention solely on the so-called equation-based simulations.
20The prefix ‘pseudo’ reflects the fact that these methods are based on an algorithm that produces numbers
on a recursive basis, eventually repeating the series of numbers produced. Pure randomness in computers
can never be achieved.
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